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INTRODUCTION : PIDLOSOPHY AND MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Freddy Mortier 
Morality is one of the preferred domains of reflection by professional 
philosophers. It is fair. to say that their contributions have not much 
concerned the area of practical morality, which was largely left to educa-
tors, clergymen and other people in guidance of dependent groups. Still, 
when a scientific study of morality was first attempted psychologists, 
sociologists and anthropologists alike turned to moral philosophy in order 
to clarify the object of their study. Thus Durkheim and Piaget relied on 
Kant's moral theory in order to guide their investigation of moral devel-
opment and education. Is has been pointed out that the roots of Dewey's 
theories on valuation and the basis of his educational projects are to be 
found in Hegel's philosophy 1. Westermarck, a distinguished pioneer of 
the comparative study of moral thought and conduct has drawn on emo-
tivist philosophical theories to formulate his views on the cultural rela-
tivity of morals. In fact, there is hardly any empirical work on morality 
which is not in one way or another indebted to moral philosophy. 
Of course, the converse is also true. Philosophers have always been 
careful to base their ethical theories on observations on moral develop-
ment and interaction and have always tried to make their theories fit those 
facts 2. Since the rise of metaethical theory with H. Sidgwick and G. E. 
Moore, however, philosophy has tended to neglect empirical findings on 
the subject of morality. Recently this trend has been reversed. Several 
philosophers have urged moral philosophy to become more practical, 
more realistic in a psychological and educational sense. Bernard Wil-
liams, for instance, in his widely acclaimed Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, denies that practical moral guidance can be derived from the 
general definition of ethical concepts 3. Similarly, Stephen Toulmin holds 
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that metaethics, taking as its model the mathematical pattern of formal 
deductive reasoning, increasingly estranged from actual practical rea-
soning 4. 
Recently, approaching the subject from different angles, a number of 
important attempts have been made at bringing together both disciplines. 
Thus, starting in 1977, MOSAIC (The Morality and Social Action Inter-
disciplinary Colloquium), an international group of psychologists, educa-
tionalists and philosophers, has done much to stimulate philosophical 
reflection in the field of moral psychology 5. And there are a number of 
similar examples of philosophers, psychologists and educationalists ac-
tually working together in moral psychological and educational research. 
Recent bibliography confirms this growing scholarly interest in bridging 
the gulfbetwen moral psychology and philosophy. The numerous referen-
ces in the major publications in the field as well as in the readers men-
tioned in note 5 testify to the breadth and depth of the philosophical 
'restructuring' of moral psychology and education. 
This is not the place to review the literature on the subject. Yet, I 
would like to mention some very recent publications although in doing so 
I risk committing gross injustices by ignoring important contributions. 
Paul Crittenden 6 has tried to uncover the assumptions of the great his-
toric philosophers on the subject of moral development and how these 
assumptions are reflected in their moral theorizing. Crittenden makes one 
aware of the extent to which the major moral philosophies (utilitarianism, 
kantianism and various brands of deontological theory, emotivism, etc.) 
depend on intuitive presuppositions on the nature of moral development. 
Recently, owen Flanagan has published a sort of summa of his earlier 
work that now can be seen as a persistent attempt at relating philosophical 
theories of the self, personal identity and theoretical ethics to empirical 
research on the social construction of the person, the nature of the emo-
tions and of cognition, on personality, etc. 7. Similarly, Thomas Wren 
has criticized, from the point of view of philosophy, the assumptions 
made by the most influential schools in moral psychology on the nature 
of motivation 8. 
There should be no doubt that the work of Lawrence Kohlberg has 
been an important impulse to this vigorous interest. To many, his work 
has assumed the nature of a paradigm for their field. However, its in-
fluence as a kind of negative paradigm, as a target for criticism and a 
standard for improvement, has been even more obvious. By using sophis-
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ticated normative models, derived from ethical theories such as Rawls', 
Hare's and Harsanyi's, and by clearly stating the philosophical presup-
positions of his approach, Kohlberg has marked the path for further 
research and reflection. Thus, much of the attention of scholars in the 
field is presently being directed to a number of outstanding questions in 
his work concerning the interface of philosophy and psychology/educa-
tional science. Without claiming exhaustiveness I would like to indicate 
a number of these problems. 
(1) First, there is Kohlberg's assumption of the primacy of justice in 
moral reasoning development. Kohlberg considers his theory to be a 
'reconstruction' of the kind of reasoning used by subjects to solve con-
flictsabout the 'right' course of action. His notion of moral development 
invariably leading to a final ideal stage, whose definition has been mainly 
taken from John Rawls' Theory of Justice, presupposes the validity of that 
normative ideal. This 'reconstructive' approach to moral development 
understandably invites criticism from the point of view of alternative 
conceptions of normative ideals. The best known challenge to Kohlberg's 
theory is Gilligan's view that there are two moral 'voices'. Gilligan 
believes that an ethics of care and responsibility is needed to complete an 
orientation to moral problems centered on the notion of justice. But there 
are other challenges as well, all taking their starting point from alter-
native philosophical conceptions of morality, e.g. 'aretaic' moral theories, 
in particularly virtue ethics, Humean emotivism, ethical centering on the 
'personal' component of morailty, etc. 
Also related to this assumption of the primacy of justice are epistemo-
logical problems concerning the definition of stages as 'unitary reasoning 
structures' and concerning the assumption of there being a developmental 
continuity, and not just a mere sequence, between these stages. These 
epistemological problems may indicate that the stage theory needs to be 
revised in important ways. 
(2) Another cluster of philosophical problems centers on Kohlberg's 
cognitivism and his insistence on the primacy of reasoning. Many people 
believe there is more to moral development and education than reasoning 
alone. In short, some of the psychological premisses of Kohlberg's theory 
invite further philosophical discussion. 
(3) Kohlberg's cognitivist emphasis has provoked critical examination 
of the supposed primacy of the epistemic self and of the corresponding 
conception of moral agency. Accordingly, philosophical positions about 
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the moral self and personal identity are examined on their relevance to 
psychological theory. 
(4) By introducing yet another ideal endpoint, a seventh stage of 'ethi-
cal' development, Kohlberg has stirred discussion about the ultimate 
'foundation ' of his views on what is mature morality. The issue turns on 
the place of moral development in personality development (cfr. J. 
Loevinger and E. Erikson) and in what Fowler has termed 'faith' devel-
opment. What, it is asked, is the relationship of moral stages - if there 
are any - to what Kohlberg has called the 'soft' stages characteristic of 
development. Is it possible to make a distinction between 'hard' stages of 
morality and 'soft' stages and what are the consequences of an answer in 
either direction to moral psychology and education? This range of prob-
lems includes the question of how a number of traditional types of moral-
ity, e.g. the ethics of friendship, agape (universal love), compassion, 
forgiveness, and ahimsa (non-violence) fit into the developmental picture. 
(5) Kohlberg's claim that moral development is universal, introduces 
yet another range of philosophical problems. How are some observations 
of the comparative study of moral development to be reconciled with this 
claim? For in many cases the ideal endpoint to which moral development 
tends seems to be inspired by philosophical traditions that are basically 
different from the Western one's. Another problem are the seemingly 
different conceptions of moral agency and ideas about the self underlying 
the moral experience of the populations studied. The problems, in other 
words, frequently are on the level of comparing the metaethical theories 
that explain moral experience and that define what it means for a rule or 
an action to be considered as 'moral' in a given society. 
A final problem in the field to which I wish to draw attention is how 
to bridge educational findings (which frequently are of a more or less 
intuitive and practical kind) and psychological theory (which becomes 
more and more sophisticated). What are the implications for educators of 
all that complicated metaethical reasoning with its attendant psychological 
research models and findings? Which approach 'works' and above all : 
why? How to translate theoretical approaches in educational precepts and 
conversely, what can education teach us about the practical soundness of 
moral philosophy? 
The present issue of Philosophica, as well as the next one, is intended 
to contribute to these ongoing debates. Jan Buelens, the first contributor, 
reviews recent findings on four strategies available to individual teachers 
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to influence and change the moral attitudes and conduct of the young. He 
concludes that the success of individual teachers in moral education, 
including those profiting from recent advances in psychological theory, 
is rather limited. Drawing on historical and sociological sources, he 
points out that schools have apparently succeeded in invariably transmit-
ting those values that are dominant in capitalist societies . Yet, some 
findings in Turiel' s psychological theory are promising : the classroom 
probably offers a relatively autonomous space in which moral develop-
ment can be promoted to a limited extent. 
J an van der Yen offers a piece of moral philosophy applied to the 
educational problem of alcohol consumption. His aim is to evaluate the 
theoretical assumptions of a public campaign that is being conducted in 
Holland. The author contrasts two approaches to the value of moderation, 
namely the idea of moderation as a norm, rule or obligation in the con-
text of a deontological 'morality of law' and the idea of moderation as a 
disposition in the context of teleological morality,ofvirtue. Illustrating his 
exposition by historical examples taken from Dutch approaches to educa-
tion, van der Ven discusses the advantages and drawbacks of value trans-
mission, value clarification and value communication in implementing the 
two moralities of moderation. He argues that an Aristotelian long-term 
conception of happiness is indispensable to the support of a campaign of 
the type launched by the Dutch government. 
The article by Hing Keung Ma is an example of cross-cultural theo-
rizing along Kohlbergian lines. The author takes up Snarey's suggestion 
that pathways of moral development probably are culture-specific from 
a certain point on. He draws on classical Chinese philosophies (mainly 
Taoism and Confucianism) to construct a psychological model to be used 
in the empirical research he is currently engaged in. Compared to Kohl-
berg's theory his model puts more emphasis on the emotional aspects of 
moral development. 
Robert Carter's contribution addres~es the question of the 'seventh' 
stage. He proposes that what Kohlberg hinted at in postulating an 'ethical' 
stage beyond morality are the elements of personal integration (feeling, 
willing and knowing) that are present in the lower stages, but become 
clearly perceptible only at the highest stages. Morality is always em-
bedded in a 'horizon' of knowing, feeling and willing that provides the 
justification and motivation to adhere to moral demands. This 'horizon' 
suggests a foundation beyond reasoning. Focusing on concepts of the self 
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one sees that the stage sequence also is a sequence of the range of 
'things' the self identifies with. The author speculates that the seventh 
stage itself can be divided into two stages, the first of which is formulated 
from the perspective of the identification of the rational self with the 
cosmos (cfr. Marcus Aurelius). The second one however is characterized 
by experiences of self-transformation that move one beyond the self. 
Carter also draws on Eastern philosophies to state his point. 
Ludo Peferoen's paper addresses a topic central to psychological theo-
ries that emphasize the role of the self in morality. He believes that an 
ideal of personal continuance is a necessary part of a complete moral 
theory. He then turns to the question whether a particular theory of 
personal identity commits one to a particular ideal of personal continu-
ance. The author takes issue with Derek Parfit's idea that adopting a 
particular theory on personal identity, namely a reductionist one that 
denies the existence of a persisting self, commits one to fundamental 
changes in one's moral beliefs. Peferoen argues that the importance 
connectedness is assumed to have in reductionist theories actually derives 
from the importance identity has to us. He concludes by suggesting that 
the fact that people do care about what kind of person they will be in the 
future itself may well be part of what makes up the fact of their identity. 
These issues on moral agency ,the self, personal identity and the related 
problems of moral motivation and action will be continued in the sequel 
to this volume. 
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